The Bush administration on so many fronts has been a step slow.
And in each case, the mix of indecision and outright incompetence has had dire results — Katrina, Afghanistan, infrastructure.
But, perhaps, nothing shows the failures of the administration so clearly as its its resposne to the housing crisis, which it has allowed to get out of control and emasculate the economy. It’s not as if the growiung number of foreclosures, especially in the sub-prime market, was a secret. There were congressional hearings last year and the issue came up during the primary season.
And yet, the administration managed to ignore it until forced to step in and save the lending institutions that acted irresponsibly — selling risky mortgages to homeowners that the banks should have known would default and then breaking the mortgages up and mixing them with other loans so they could be sold on the financial markets.
The plans, so far, have fallen far short of effectiveness, leaving housing prices to continue their downward spiral and taking with them the equity that homeowners were convinced would rise forever. That lost equity means an end to the house-as-credit-card mentality encouraged by the banks, an approach that put a lot of cash in consumers’ hands but masked some real economic problems that were brewing.
Yesterday, the administration unveiled yet another plan to address the crisis — what he called a “redefinition” of the poorly conceived $700 billion federal bailout.
In recasting the program, the Treasury no longer plans to buy troubled assets from financial firms, the idea initially presented to the country, but instead will offer aid to banks and other firms that issue student, auto and credit card loans in part by jump-starting the market that provides financing for these companies.
“This market . . . has for all practical purposes ground to a halt,” Paulson said at a news briefing. “Today, the illiquidity in this sector is raising the cost and reducing the availability of car loans, student loans and credit cards. This is creating a heavy burden on the American people and reducing the number of jobs in our economy.”
The new old plan, however, will not assist the people hurting the most — homeowners. Protecting them directly — by extending unemployment benefits, imposing a foreclosure moratorium or other measures — will have to wait.
Paulson’s revisions followed Treasury’s announcement on Tuesday that it would streamline the mortgage process.
This program attempts to address that by using a simplified process for determining whether someone is eligible for a new loan. Instead of the standard cumbersome loan modification process, which can include reviewing a borrower’s credit report and tax returns, the new plan focuses on the borrower’s income and how much he or she can afford to pay. It also creates a formula for determining what a homeowner can afford, eliminating some guesswork.
Government officials said they expect the effort, dubbed the Streamlined Modification Program, to be able to help “hundreds of thousands” of homeowners.
But critics — including Federal Deposit Insurance Commission Chairwoman Sheila C. Bair — say the program doesn’t go far enough.
The plan announced Tuesday by federal officials and mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac sounds sweeping in its approach: Borrowers would get reduced interest rates or longer loan terms to make their payments more affordable.
But there’s a catch. The plan focuses on loans Fannie and Freddie own or guarantee. They are the dominant players in the U.S. mortgage market but represent only 20 percent of delinquent loans.
Sheila Bair, chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., said the plan “falls short of what is needed to achieve wide-scale modifications of distressed mortgages.”
With the government spending billions to aid distressed banks, “we must also devote some of that money to fixing the front-end problem: too many unaffordable home loans,” Bair said in a statement.
The New York Times was pretty blunt in its assessment, calling it “another too-little, too-late solution” and part of “the administration’s pathetic responses” to the crisis. The problem, according to the Times, is that the administration has been unwilling to intervene to prevent foreclosures while at teh same time “”intervening forcefully — using taxpayer dollars — on behalf of an ever-expanding cast of bailout recipients” in the financial sector.
That is a huge policy error. The whole point of the bailouts is to stabilize the financial system. But the system will not stabilize until house prices stabilize, and house prices will not stabilize until the government finds a way to stanch foreclosures on a large scale.
The Times offers an alternative: Use the bankruptcy courts.
As a candidate, President-elect Barack Obama favored amending the law so bankrupt homeowners could have their mortgages revised in court, an avenue currently denied them. The next Congress must move forward on the bankruptcy amendment first thing in January.
Hundreds of thousands of homeowners would qualify for bankruptcy, and hundreds of thousands more would be helped if lenders and investors opted to restructure bad loans rather than having to go to court. Better still, bankruptcy restructurings would cost the taxpayers nothing and concentrate the pain on those responsible: borrowers who took on more debt than they could handle, and lenders who made bad loans.
Bankruptcy offers other uses that would be more beneficial to the economy and the taxpayer, as former Clinton Labor Secretary Robert Reich points out:
When a big company that gets into trouble is more valuable living than dead, there used to be a well-established legal process for reorganizing it – called chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Under it, creditors took some losses, shareholders even bigger ones, some managers’ heads rolled. Companies cleaned up their books and got a fresh start. And taxpayers didn’t pay a penny.
So why, exactly, is the Treasury substituting government bailouts for chapter 11? Even if you assume Wall Street’s major banks and insurance giant AIG are so important to the national and global economy that they can’t be allowed to fail, that doesn’t mean they have to be bailed out. They could be reorganized under bankruptcy protection. True, their creditors, shareholders, and executives would take bigger hits than they’re taking now that taxpayers are bailing them out. But they’re the ones who took the risk. We didn’t.
A bailout in some form might be appropriate for the auto industry, “because two and a half million households depend directly or indirectly on them for their paychecks.” the best approach, however, is not a no-strings bailout but to put conditions on aid, Reich says.
In exchange for government aid, the Big Three’s creditors, shareholders, and executives should be required to accept losses as large as they’d endure under chapter 11, and the UAW should agree to some across-the-board wage and benefit cuts. The resulting savings, combined with the bailout, should be enough to allow the Big Three to shift production to more fuel efficient cars while keeping almost all its current workforce employed. Ideally, major parts suppliers would adhere to the same conditions.
Remember: The underlying goal is to help Americans through this crisis and come out of it with a stronger economy.
So, enough with the free money to the monied classes. Enough with helping out the people who already have the cash, the people who made bad bets and awful business decisions. Let’s direct our efforts to helping the rest of us.
