The socialism of fools

There was a time when Americans made things. People from Central Jersey still can remember the massive slogan on the Trenton bridge crossing the Delaware River on Business Route 1:

Trenton Makes The World Takes.

Installed during the 1930s, the sign could be said to have been the motto of every small to midsize city in the country for much of the last century — not only New Jersey cities like New Brunswick and Phillipsburg, but urban manufacturing centers like Youngstown, Ohio, and Gary, Ind.

That was during another time. Over the last three decades, as the writer Kevin Phillips pointed out to Bill Moyers on Friday, on Bill Moyers’ Journal, the nation’s manufacturing base, which had driven the economy, has atrophied. In its place, he says, you have a financial sector that has “hijacked the economy.” The rapid growth in the financial sector, combined with its political power and ties to the political establishment of both parties meant that it has come to control the political agenda.

This has been going on since the beginning of the 1980s. Finance has been preferred as the sector that got government support. Manufacturing slides, nobody helps. Finance has a problem, Federal Reserve to the rescue. Treasury to the rescue. Subsidies this, that, and other.

So bit by bit, they got bigger.

And as the industry has gotten bigger, its hold on political power has grown — with friends in high places like Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and the various treasury secretaries who have served since the 1980s, including Bob Rubin under President Bill Clinton.

And as it has gotten bigger with its tentacles reaching deeper into the national economy, the sector’s health has become conflated with the health of the overall economy — which is where Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s bailout plan comes in.

Paulson, speaking at a Senate hearing on Tuesday, said that the proposal he announced last week was designed to “stabilize our financial system” to “avoid a continuing series of financial institution failures and frozen credit markets that threaten American families’ financial well-being, the viability of businesses both small and large, and the very health of our economy.”

He described his plan as a

a program to remove troubled assets from the system. This troubled asset relief program has to be properly designed for immediate implementation and be sufficiently large to have maximum impact and restore market confidence. It must also protect the taxpayer to the maximum extent possible, and include provisions that ensure transparency and oversight while also ensuring the program can be implemented quickly and run effectively.

The market turmoil we are experiencing today poses great risk to U.S. taxpayers. When the financial system doesn’t work as it should, Americans’ personal savings, and the ability of consumers and businesses to finance spending, investment and job creation are threatened.

The ultimate taxpayer protection will be the market stability provided as we remove the troubled assets from our financial system. I am convinced that this bold approach will cost American families far less than the alternative a continuing series of financial institution failures and frozen credit markets unable to fund everyday needs and economic expansion.

For Paulson, speed is of the essence. He said Congress needed

to enact this bill quickly and cleanly, and avoid slowing it down with other provisions that are unrelated or don’t have broad support. This troubled asset purchase program on its own is the single most effective thing we can do to help homeowners, the American people and stimulate our economy.

But is it? Senators on the Senate Banking Committee were not so sanguine about the possibility of handing over nearly a trillion dollars to the financiers who drove the bus off the cliff, especially when many of the CEOs of the failing banks and investment firms were walking away with juicy compensation packages as the people they lent money to were being asked to leave their homes.

Sen. Jim Bunning, a Kentucky Republican, called the plan “financial socialism” because it would “take Wall Street’s pain and spread it to the taxpayers.”

And Sen. Chris Dodd, D-Conn.,

called the crisis “entirely foreseeable and preventable, not an act of God,” and said that it angered him to think about “the authors of this calamity” walking away with the usual golden parachutes while taxpayers pick up the bill.

“There is no second act on this,” Mr. Dodd said, acknowledging that speed was important. But it is more important, he said, “to get it right.”

Matt Rothschild, editor of The Progressive (disclosure: I write for Matt through the Progressive Media Project), called the bailouts “socialism for Wall Street.” The bailouts of AIG, Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will not “help the people who are hurting in this country, especially the people who are being foreclosed upon.”

For less money, Washington could have backed their mortgages and let them stay in their homes. It could have marked the mortgages down by 25% or so, since the homes were overvalued. But this would have made it easier for people to make their payments, and the government also could have frozen the increase in the subprime rates that were killing the homeowners.

Since the housing sector was at the epicenter of the financial crisis, the government’s backing of individual mortgages could have lent some stability to the industry, and put an orderly floor on the deflation. This could have stanched some of the bleeding at the investment firms that had recklessly bet on the housing market, as well.

But rather than put the individuals first, the government has put Wall Street first.

And that’s socialism for the greediest, not the neediest.

Gretchen Morgenson, a business writer for The New York Times, was just as critical during an interview on Friday’s Bill Moyers’ Journal:

The ugly thing about this is this is privatizing gains and socializing losses. So when things are going well, the managements make out, the shareholders make out, the counterparties are fine. All the private sector people do well. But when something goes wrong, when decisions are made that turn out to be bad decisions, the U.S. taxpayer has to take on the problem.

And there’s something very wrong about that. Because all of those people that made all that money are running off here into the distance with the money, carrying it in
their bags. And the United States taxpayer is on the hook.

This is reason enough to slow down. Bob Herbert, writing in The New York Times, acknowledges that “the system came perilously close to collapse last week and needs to be stabilized as quickly as possible.”

But we don’t know yet that King Henry’s fiat, his $700 billion solution, is the best solution. Like the complex mortgage-based instruments at the heart of this debacle, nobody has a real grasp yet of the vast implications of Mr. Paulson’s remedy.

Experts need some reasonable amount of time — I’m talking about days, not weeks — to home in on the weak points, the loopholes, the potential unintended consequences of a bailout of this magnitude.

The patchwork modifications being offered by Democrats in Congress are insufficient. Reasonable estimates need to be made of the toll to be taken on taxpayers. Reasonable alternatives need to be heard.

And they need to be heard precisely “because the people who have been running the economy for so long — who have ruined it — cannot be expected to make things right again in 48 or 96 hours.”

Mr. Paulson himself was telling us during the summer that the economy was sound, that its long-term fundamentals were “strong,” that growth would rebound by the end of the year, when most of the slump in housing prices would be over.

He has been wrong every step of the way, right up until early last week, about the severity of the economic crisis. As for President Bush, the less said the better.

The free-market madmen who treated the American economy like a giant casino have had their day. It’s time to drag them away from the tables and into the sunlight of reality.

And they should be made to pay. In the end, any bailout package has to be structured to protect taxpayers and homeowners and not reward companies and CEOs who made bad bets — as Dean Baker wrote earlier today.

The bailout has to be painful, it is not supposed to be a reward for ridiculously overpaid executives who pushed their companies to the edge of bankruptcy. If the government’s purchases of bad debt were tied to serious restrictions on executive compensation and the forced sale of equity to the government, then only banks that really needed the money would line up for the bailout. Under these terms, we could include whatever assets the Wall Street boys and girls want to sell.

I want to go back the Trenton Makes bridge and our history as a manufacturing nation for a second. The textiles, iron works, furniture, automobiles and other goods produced by American workers in the past were a tangible product of the money invested by the financial industry. What has happened to our economy is that we have replaced our productive investments with what many commentators have called an elaborate pyramid scheme in which money is moved from account to account, increasing in value without creating anything productive.

Once the foundation of the pyramid is exposed as a fake, the entire thing comes crumbling down. My fear is that’s what’s happening, that there is little we do will prevent the collapse and the best we can hope for is to craft measures to make it as painless as possible.

The great rock and roll swindle

Some harsh criticism in the nation’s press today and over the weekend of the Paulson plan to bail out Wall Street.

First, William Greider, of The Nation, bluntly explains the upshot of the Paulson plan — what he calls “the Wall Street Journal solution” — as being to “dump it all on the taxpayers.” The plan, he says,

would relieve the major banks and investment firms of their mountainous rotten assets and make the public swallow their losses–many hundreds of billions, maybe much more. What’s not to like if you are a financial titan threatened with extinction?

If Wall Street gets away with this, it will represent an historic swindle of the American public–all sugar for the villains, lasting pain and damage for the victims.

He is not questioning the need for government intervention. On the contrary, he says, the “government is not acting forcefully enough — using its ultimate emergency powers to take full control of the financial system and impose order on banks, firms and markets.”

A serious intervention in which Washington takes charge would, first, require a new central authority to supervise the financial institutions and compel them to support the government’s actions to stabilize the system. Government can apply killer leverage to the financial players: accept our objectives and follow our instructions or you are left on your own–cut off from government lending spigots and ineligible for any direct assistance. If they decline to cooperate, the money guys are stuck with their own mess. If they resist the government’s orders to keep lending to the real economy of producers and consumers, banks and brokers will be effectively isolated, therefore doomed.

Only with these conditions, and some others, should the federal government be willing to take ownership — temporarily–of the rotten financial assets that are dragging down funds, banks and brokerages. Paulson and the Federal Reserve are trying to replay the bailout approach used in the 1980s for the savings and loan crisis, but this situation is utterly different. The failed S&Ls held real assets–property, houses, shopping centers–that could be readily resold by the Resolution Trust Corporation at bargain prices. This crisis involves ethereal financial instruments of unknowable value–not just the notorious mortgage securities but various derivative contracts and other esoteric deals that may be virtually worthless.

As he points out, however, the savings and loan scandal resulted in a massive transfer of wealth as the Wall Street firms that helped finance the mess “got to buy back the same properties for pennies from the RTC — profiting on the upside, then again on the downside” — all on the public’s dime. Greider says that he suspects that “Wall Street is envisioning a similar bonanza–the chance to harvest new profit from their own fraud and criminal irresponsibility.”

However,

If government acts responsibly, it will impose some other conditions on any broad rescue for the bankers. First, take due bills from any financial firms that get to hand off their spoiled assets, that is, a hard contract that repays government from any future profits once the crisis is over. Second, when the politicians get around to reforming financial regulations and dismantling the gimmicks and “too big to fail” institutions, Wall Street firms must be prohibited from exercising their usual manipulations of the political system. Call off their lobbyists, bar them from the bribery disguised as campaign contributions. Any contact or conversations between the assisted bankers and financial houses with government agencies or elected politicians must be promptly reported to the public, just as regulated industries are required to do when they call on government regulars.

More important, if the taxpayers are compelled to refinance the villains in this drama, then Americans at large are entitled to equivalent treatment in their crisis. That means the suspension of home foreclosures and personal bankruptcies for debt-soaked families during the duration of this crisis. The debtors will not escape injury and loss–their situation is too dire–but they deserve equal protection from government, the chance to work out things gradually over some years on reasonable terms.

The government, meanwhile, may have to create another emergency agency, something like the New Deal, that lends directly to the real economy–businesses, solvent banks, buyers and sellers in consumer markets. We don’t know how much damage has been done to economic growth or how long the cold spell will last, but I don’t trust the bankers in the meantime to provide investment capital and credit. If
necessary, Washington has to fill that role, too.

Chris Hedges, in Truth Dig, was even more blunt:
The lobbyists and corporate lawyers, the heads of financial firms and the crooks who control Wall Street, all those who spent the last three decades assuring us that government was part of the problem and should get out of the way, are now busy looting the U.S. treasury. They are also working feverishly inside the Democratic and Republican parties to blunt any effective regulatory reform as they pass on their distressed assets to us. The process is stunning in its hubris and mendacity, and two of the most potent enablers of this unprecedented act of corporate welfare are John McCain and Barack Obama.

He said the bailout plan, because it “does not include robust new mechanisms of regulation, accountability and control” is likely be “nothing more than a massive taxpayer-funded bailout of stockholders and the financial industry.”

If the financial-services industry is able to suck us dry, our assets, from our homes to our retirement investments, will continue to tumble. Taxes will go up. Jobs will be lost. The grim economic indicators will get worse. The dollar, which has already lost about a third of its value against the euro, will continue to plummet. The rate of foreclosures, one in every 416 U.S. households in August, will skyrocket. Consumer spending, the engine of the U.S. economy, will continue to decline. Industrial production, which has fallen for three consecutive quarters, will fall further. Unemployment, which shot up to 6.1 percent in August from 5.7 percent in July, will get worse. These tremors presage an earthquake.

Paul Krugman, in The New York Times, points out another dangerous element of the plan — the “extraordinary power” it would bestow on the treasury secretary.

He offers a short synopsis of the economic meltdown:

1. The bursting of the housing bubble has led to a surge in defaults and foreclosures, which in turn has led to a plunge in the prices of mortgage-backed securities — assets whose value ultimately comes from mortgage payments.

2. These financial losses have left many financial institutions with too little capital — too few assets compared with their debt. This problem is especially severe because everyone took on so much debt during the bubble years.

3. Because financial institutions have too little capital relative to their debt, they haven’t been able or willing to provide the credit the economy needs.

4. Financial institutions have been trying to pay down their debt by selling assets, including those mortgage-backed securities, but this drives asset prices down and makes their financial position even worse. This vicious circle is what some call the “paradox of deleveraging.”

The response by Paulson, however, is unlikely to fix the damage or prevent future damage, primarilybecause Paulson is pushing a “clean” plan — i.e., “a taxpayer-financed bailout with no strings attached — no quid pro quo on the part of those being bailed out.” He also wants “dictatorial authority, plus immunity from review ‘by any court of law or any administrative agency.’” All of this, he says, is a recipe for disaster.

But don’t expect Washington to back away from the Paulson plan. There are few politicians — especially the two major-party presidential candidates — who are willing to buck Wall Street.

$2,000 a person

More details on the government bailout of the securities industry were released today, and it appears that the price tag is going to be high. The problem is that the plan, as I said yesterday, focuses only on the banks and not on the folks out there who are facing foreclosure.

Here is how The New York Times describes today’s announcement:

WASHINGTON — The Bush administration on Saturday formally proposed a vast bailout of financial institutions in the United States, requesting unfettered authority for the Treasury Department to buy up to $700 billion in distressed mortgage-related assets from the private firms.

The proposal, not quite three pages long, was stunning for its stark simplicity. It would raise the national debt ceiling to $11.3 trillion. And it would place no restrictions on the administration other than requiring semiannual reports to Congress, granting the Treasury secretary unprecedented power to buy and resell mortgage debt.

“This is a big package, because it was a big problem,” President Bush said Saturday at a White House news conference, after meeting with President Álvaro Uribe of Colombia. “I will tell our citizens and continue to remind them that the risk of doing nothing far outweighs the risk of the package, and that, over time, we’re going to get a lot of the money back.”

The story adds that the

$700 billion expenditure on distressed mortgage-related assets would roughly be what the country has spent so far in direct costs on the Iraq war and more than the Pentagon’s total yearly budget appropriation. Divided across the population, it would amount to more than $2,000 for every man, woman and child in the United States.

And would

add to a budget deficit already projected at more than $500 billion next year. And it comes on top of the $85 billion government rescue of the insurance giant American International Group and a plan to spend up to $200 billion to shore up the mortgage finance giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

The president is pitching the plan as “helping every American.”

“The government,” he said, “needed to send a clear signal that we understood the instability could ripple throughout and affect the working people and the average family, and we weren’t going to let that happen.”

But it is really about helping investors. And while an earlier bailout package included provisions “to help troubled borrowers refinance mortgages,” the “financing for it depended largely on fees paid by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which have been placed into a government conservatorship.”

Not exactly reassuring given that it was government inaction, along with Wall Street greed that got us into this mess.

Too big to fail, too small to help

I’ve been holding off on posting on the economic crisis because the massiveness of what’s happened is in many ways hard to fathom.

But listening to the news coverage today of the federal bailout plan left me shaking my head, as if the only thing that matters is the impact that the crumbling economy has on banks and investment firms.

The impact on taxpayers and the government’s unwillingness to step in and aid the thousands of homeowners who have been burned and will continue to be burned by the unscrupulous practices of the homeloan industry remain a rarely discussed aspect of this.

The plan, estimated to cost a minimum of $500 billion and as much as $1 trillion,

include buying assets only from United States financial institutions — but not hedge funds — and hiring outside advisers who would work for the Treasury, rather than creating a separate agency.

The bailout is based on the idea that the investment houses in trouble are too large and have too great a reach into our economy to be allowed to crumble under the weight of their own bad decisions.

But are they too big to fail? There is some evidence that they are — allowing them to collapse could lead to a credit crunch that could, as Paul Krugman said on The Rachel Maddow Show, stop business in its track and lead to higher unemployment.

That said, Krugman, on his blog, said he is “uneasy”:

Here’s the source of my uneasiness: the underlying premise behind the buyout seems, still, to be that this is mainly a liquidity problem. So if the government stands ready to buy securities at “fair value”, all will be well. But it’s by no means clear that this is right. On one side, the government could all too easily end up paying more than the securities are worth — and if there isn’t some kind of mechanism for capturing windfalls, this could turn into a bailout of the stockholders at taxpayer expense.

On the other side, what if large parts of the financial sector are still underwater even if the assets are sold at “fair value”? Is there a provision for recapitalizing firms so they can keep on functioning?

Not that the big banks and investment firms have been investing in American jobs or American infrastructure. As Harold Meyerson writes in The Washington Post,

During the late, lamented Wall Street boom, America’s leading investment institutions were plenty bullish on China’s economy, on exotic financial devices built atop millions of bad loans, and, above all — judging by the unprecedented amount of wealth they showered on the Street — on themselves. The last thing our financial community was bullish on was America — that is, the America where the vast majority of Americans live and work.

Over the past eight years, the U.S. economy has created just 5 million new jobs, a number that is falling daily. The median income of American households has declined. Airports, bridges and roads are decaying. Rural wind-power facilities cannot light cities because our electrical grid has not been expanded. New Orleans has not been rebuilt. And as productive activity within the United States has ceased to be the prime target of investment, household consumption — more commonly known as shopping — has come to comprise more than 70 percent of our economy.

The banks’ underinvestment in America was hardly due to a lack of capital. But even as petrodollars and China’s dollars poured into Wall Street, the investment houses directed trillions into new and ever more dubious credit instruments, which yielded massive profits for Wall Streeters and their highflying investors, and put chump change into efforts to improve, to take just one example, American transportation.

The finance-based economy, in fact, has been our biggest problem, Meyerson writes.

Finance set the terms of corporate behavior over the past quarter-century, and not in ways that bolstered the economy. By its actions — elevating shareholder value over the interests of other corporate stakeholders, focusing on short-term investments rather than patient capital, pressuring corporations to offshore jobs and cut wages and benefits — Wall Street plainly preferred to fund production abroad and consumption at home. The internal investment strategy of 100 years ago was turned on its head. Where Morgan once funneled European capital into American production, for the past decade Morgan’s successors have directed Asian capital into devices to enable Americans to take on more debt to buy Asian products.

Worse yet, as Wall Street turned its back on America, so did government. The Bush administration and congressional Republicans (John McCain among them) kept American incomes low by opposing hikes in the minimum wage; helping employers defeat unionization; and shunning policies to modernize infrastructure, make college more affordable, and boost spending on basic science and research.

Dean Baker, of the Center for Economic Policy Research, says that the federal “proposal to throw out hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars to buy up this debt will do little if anything to prevent another round of collapsing banks” because it doesn’t address the basic issue, i.e., the broken regulatory system.

He asks,

how will we get the banks to honestly describe the assets they throw into the auction? Will we rely on the rating agencies?

Maybe the Bush crew missed this one, but a big problem in the housing bubble financial flow was the fact the rating agencies accepted many false claims by the banks and therefore rated a lot of junk as investment grade debt. Has the Bush administration figured out how it will get around this problem with its reverse auction system?

The Democratic leadership in the House and Senate, according to The New York Times, want the plan also “to provide relief to millions of families that were poised to lose their homes to foreclosure.”

Representative Barney Frank, Democrat of Massachusetts and chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, said the plan would have to include requirements that the government reduce the loan amounts or improve the terms for many distressed borrowers.

“We should be more willing to write down the mortgages,” Mr. Frank said in a telephone interview on Friday. “We’ll become the lender. The government will wind up in a controlling position so that we can reduce the number of foreclosures.”

That would make some sense, but you can already hear the conservatives crying that there just isn’t enough cash to make this happen. So, to sum up: We have up to $1 trillion for the investment industry, but exactly what for the rest of us. Nice.

Aggressive action? Yeah, right.

I think it is pretty clear that when President Bush says he plans aggressive action to aid financial markets that he is talking about financial markets and not about the people affected by the ‘s clear from his actions (taking over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, offering support to big corporations, but only grudgingly providing the smallest of help to individuals).

“The American people can be sure we will continue to act to strengthen and stabilize our financial markets and improve investor confidence,” Bush said in two minutes of remarks delivered outside the Oval Office.

He did not specify what actions would be taken. The president was to meet with economic advisers over much of the day, and was seeing Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson at the White House later today.

“Our financial markets continue to deal with serious challenges,” he said. “As our recent actions demonstrate, my administration is focused on meeting these challenges.”

My question is this: How does that help my neighbor with his credit card debt or medical bills?