Debate response

I waited tonight to comment on the debate, primarily because I was at work. My sense, having watched a good portion and listened to some, is that the parameters of the election have not changed.

John McCain has his best debate performance, but still managed not to win because Barack Obama was far more systematic and focused in describing his policy. McCain’s explanations tended to ramble, tended to hit upon snippets of policy, attack lines and stock phrases that I suspect will read poorly in text. Plus, he also showed an erratic temper that flared up at odd times with odd facial ticks and gestures.

This kind of thing might seem inconsequential, but the temperment question is important — as McCain has repeatedly said. “The steady hand at the tiller,” he proclaims himself to be, when it is clear that Obama — whose manner easily could have been described as dull or boring — proved himself to be steadier, on more of an even keel than McCain, less flappable.

The times are volatile and it appears that the volatility has a worried public looking for someone who can exude a calmness that McCain seems to lack.

I won’t get into policy — I clearly disagree with McCain on most things and with Obama on many. But I think that Obama has been better able to explain himself and make Americans understand where he wants to take the nation. And that is what ultimately is important.

Down it goes again

Apparently, Monday’s upward spike in the stock market was nothing more than a blip. After a record increase — it surged 936 points on Monday — the Dow Jones Industrial average fell by almost 80 points Tuesday and cratered today, dropping 733 points.

The reason, according analysts quoted by The New York Times, is that

the market was continuing to react to the same fundamental factors that drove it lower in the morning, including weakness in the manufacturing sector, the large drop in retail sales and the growing realization that there will be no quick fix to the credit
crisis
.

The stock selloff occurs just a day after the federal government agreed to buy into American banks to prop them up, essentially nationalizing them. Though the nationalization plan, as Robert Weissman of Essential Action wrote in Common Dreams, “the government may be obtaining a modest ownership stake in the banks, but no control over their operations.”

In keeping with the terms of the $700 billion bailout legislation, under which the bank share purchase plan is being carried out, the Treasury Department has announced guidelines for executive compensation for participating banks. These are laughable. The most important rule prohibits incentive compensation arrangements that “encourage unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the financial institution.” Gosh, do we need to throw $250 billion at the banks to persuade executives not to adopt incentive schemes that threaten their own institutions?

The banks reportedly will not be able to increase dividends, but will be able to maintain them at current levels. Really? The banks are bleeding hundreds of billions of dollars — with more to come — and they are taking money out to pay shareholders? The banks are not obligated to lend with the money they are getting. The banks are not obligated to re-negotiate mortgage terms with borrowers — even though a staggering one in six homeowners owe more than the value of their homes.

“The government’s role will be limited and temporary,” President Bush said in announcing today’s package. “These measures are not intended to take over the free market, but to preserve it.”

That may not be enough. The role of the financial sector in our economy has grown beyond what can be described as healthy, reaching dizzying and dangerous levels. Kevin Phillips, author of “Bad Money: Reckless Finance, Failed Politics, and the Global Crisis of American Capitalism,” says the reliance on the financial sector offers a “chilling parallel with the failures of the old powers.”

In the 18th century, the Dutch thought they could replace their declining industry and physical commerce with grand money-lending schemes to foreign nations and princes. But a series of crashes and bankruptcies in the 1760s and 1770s crippled Holland’s economy. In the early 1900s, one apprehensive minister argued that Britain could not thrive as a “hoarder of invested securities” because “banking is not the creator of our prosperity but the creation of it.” By the late 1940s, the debt loads of two world wars proved the point, and British global economic leadership became history.

In the United States, the financial services sector passed manufacturing as a component of the GDP in the mid-1990s. But market enthusiasm seems to have blocked any debate over this worrying change: In the 1970s, manufacturing occupied 25 percent of GDP and financial services just 12 percent, but by 2003-06, finance enjoyed 20-21 percent, and manufacturing had shriveled to 12 percent.

The downside is that the final four or five percentage points of financial-sector GDP expansion in the 1990s and 2000s involved mischief and self-dealing: the exotic mortgage boom, the reckless bundling of loans into securities and other innovations better left to casinos. Run-amok credit was the lubricant. Between 1987 and 2007, total debt in the United States jumped from $11 trillion to $48 trillion, and private financial-sector debt led the great binge.

Washington looked kindly on the financial sector throughout the 1980s and 1990s, providing it with endless liquidity flows and bailouts. Inexcusably, movers and shakers such as Greenspan, former treasury secretary Robert Rubin and the current secretary, Henry Paulson, refused to regulate the industry. All seemed to welcome asset bubbles; they may have figured the finance industry to be the new dominant sector of economic evolution, much as industry had replaced agriculture in the late 19th century. But who seriously expects the next great economic power — China, India, Brazil — to have a GDP dominated by finance?

With the help of the overgrown U.S. financial sector, the United States of 2008 is the world’s leading debtor, has by far the largest current-account deficit and is the leading importer, at great expense, of both manufactured goods and oil. The potential damage if the world soon undergoes the greatest financial crisis since the 1930s is incalculable. The loss of global economic leadership that overtook Britain and Holland seems to be looming on our own horizon.

He wrote this in the spring as it appeared that the teetering economy was stabilizing, well before the current implosion, making him seem a bit clairvoyant.

But he has been banging this drum for a while, along with William Greider and others.

But diagnosing the crisis is only part of what we have to consider. The question is where we go from here. First, we should revamp the Paulson plan so that buying shares in the banks gives the federal government a voting interest.

More importantly, we need to invest heavily in the American people, as Howard Zinn, the radical progressive historian, suggests in The Nation. He says we should

take that huge sum of money, $700 billion, and give it directly to the people who need it. Let the government declare a moratorium on foreclosures and help homeowners pay off their mortgages. Create a federal jobs program to guarantee work to people who want and need jobs.

We have a historic and successful precedent. The government in the early days of the New Deal put millions of people to work rebuilding the nation’s infrastructure. Hundreds of thousands of young people, instead of joining the army to escape poverty, joined the Civil Conservation Corps, which built bridges and highways, cleaned up harbors and rivers. Thousands of artists, musicians and writers were employed by the WPA’s arts programs to paint murals, produce plays, write symphonies. The New Deal (defying the cries of “socialism”) established Social Security, which, along with the GI Bill, became a model for what government could do to help its people.

That can be carried further, with “health security”–free healthcare for all, administered by the government, paid for from our Treasury, bypassing the insurance companies and the other privateers of the health industry. All that will take more than $700 billion. But the money is there: in the $600 billion for the military budget, once we decide we will not be a warmaking nation anymore, and in the bloated bank accounts of the superrich, once we bring them down to ordinary-rich size by taxing vigorously their income and their wealth.

Don’t expect these proposals — at least not yet. Barack Obama has hinted at a public-works-based stimulus, but a small one. Like Sen. John McCain — whose economic plan appears to consist solely of cutting the cabe cutting capital gains tax — Sen. Obama has offered unfortunately narrow economic proposals.

That said, Franklin Delano Roosevelt did not run on the New Deal, but moved quickly in that direction as it became clear he had no choice. Maybe, Sen. Obama will follow that example if he is elected.

Remembering the ’72 race

I think this is one of the first pieces, blog or otherwise, coming from a political commentator (historians may have a different take) that I think accurately reflects on the 1972 election — and not just because he echoes something I’ve written before.

Basically, George McGovern was going to lose to Richard Nixon — nearly any Democrat would have. But McGovern faced, as Matt Yglesias points out, a concerted effort on the part of his own party to undermine his campaign. McGovern was “the only Democratic Party presidential nominee to not secure the AFL-CIO’s endorsement,” a snub that came not “because of any failure to support the labor movement on key labor issues.”

He had a solid pro-labor record, and a very solid record of support for the concerns of working people. But the AFL-CIO leadership, including its disastrous president George Meany, was dominated by cultural conservatives and Cold War hawks who decided to screw McGovern over.

He calls this “an aspect of American political history that’s not well-understood.”

McGovern would have lost the election no matter what. Frankly, nobody was going to beat an incumbent President amidst the strong economy of 1972. And you certainly weren’t going to do it by nominating an unusually left-wing candidate. But a big reason McGovern did so extremely poorly was that huge swathes of the progressive establishment — including organized labor — just flat-out refused to support him, often for very bad reasons. Under those circumstances, it’s just impossible to put up a respectable showing.

This 1972 story from Time outlines the kind of things that were at stake during the Democratic primary that year and the convention and just how angry and scared the party’s old guard was of the new McGovern voter. I think there is some evidence, as well, that McGovern was surprised by how he was adopted by younger voters and that he never expected to find himself on the wrong side of this dispute. But he was, with

a stop-McGovern coalition led by Arkansas’ Wilbur Mills continued its last-minute efforts. A small Washington group of strategists bent on heading off the South Dakotan included Humphrey Aide Stan Bregman, Muskie’s Berl Bernhard, Wallace’s Billy Joe Camp and the AFL-CIO’s Al Barkan.

Acrimony. At his summer house in Maryland, McGovern tended his swimming pool and delegate arithmetic. At one point he paid a second courtesy call on George Wallace, presumably to feel out the Alabaman’s intentions. Occasionally McGovern spoke apocalyptically of the consequences if his nomination were “literally stolen in a naked power play.” He did not discount running as a third-party candidate. Said McGovern: “I don’t think people have fully assessed how the party could destroy itself if the reform process is denied after all that has happened in American politics these past few years.”

Many regulars, humbled by the McGovern young and suddenly astonished by their own impotence, already see ruination for the party. St. Louis Dentist Martin Greenberg, for four years the Democratic chairman of St. Louis County, found himself outnumbered by McGovernites in the spring caucuses and defeated for delegate. Last week he contemplated the prospect of a McGovern nomination and said dolefully: “Unless the party comes to its senses, it will destroy all of us. The acrimony and dissension will be suicidal. The disaster this fall will not only be felt on the national ticket but on statewide Democratic tickets as well.”

The party was badly damaged, though I would argue that it may have been inevitable, growing out of the divisiveness of the preceding decade and the recalcitrance of the old guard. Not that a public reconciliation between McGovern and the anti-McGovern forces would have changed the results of the November election. At best, it may have narrowed Nixon’s victory margin.